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TRADE SECRETS AND THE SKILLED EMPLOYEE IN
THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY
With the development of the Electronic Numerical Integrator and
Computer (ENIAC),1 the Electronics Revolution began.2  As the
Revolution gained momentum,3 the need for highly trained research-
ers, engineers and technicians increased dramatically.4 These key em-
ployees5 often obtain access to an employer's confidential business
information.6 When they change jobs within the same competitive in-
dustry, they inevitably reveal previously acquired knowledge, much of
it confidential business information, to their new employers.' Some of
this knowledge may constitute a trade secret.8
When determining whether trade secret protection is warranted,
courts must strike a balance between the conflicting social policies of
freedom of contract, business ethics and private economic freedom.
This balancing process has left a checkered history of the law of trade
secret protection in the context of the employment relationship.9
This Note discusses the legal grounds for trade secret protection, 10
with a particular focus on the employment relationship. 1 Further, this
Note considers the conflicting social policies which courts must balance
1. J. P. Eckert & J.W. Mauchly, Patent No. 3,120,606, granted February 4, 1967, 744 U.S.
PAT. OFF. GAZETTE, 178.
2. Asimov Foresees New Industrial Reyolution, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 9, 1981, at 26, col. 1.
3. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
5. Commentators refer to skilled researchers, engineers and technicians as "key employees"
because of their uniquely knowledgeable positions in the employer's firm. See, e.g., VonKalinow-
ski, Key Employees and Trade Secrets, 47 VA. L. Rav. 583, 583 (1961).
6. The term "confidential business information" refers to all information which the em-
ployer subjectively wishes to keep confidential. The term "trade secret," on the other hand, refers
to confidential business information which is legally protectable. See infra notes 45-59 and ac-
companying text.
7. See, e.g., Gillette Co. v. Williams, 360 F. Supp. 1171, 1176-78 (D. Conn. 1978). Key
employees have access to items of confidential business information, many of which are often
assimilated into their general knowledge. If a second employer asks a computer programmer to
develop a program to solve a particular problem, this programmer will undoubtedly draw upon
the knowledge and experience gained while with the first employer. If the employee uses confi-
dential information of his first employer to solve the second employer's problem, it is conceivable
that the second employer could acquire some of the first employer's trade secrets.
8. See infra notes 37-59 and accompanying text.
9. A. TURNER, THE LAW OF TRADE SECRETS 3 (1962).
10. See infra notes 29-59 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
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when faced with trade secret protection problems arising from com-
puter industry employment relationships.1 2 Finally, this Note exam-
ines the viability of proposed means of dealing with employee
appropriation of trade secrets, 13 and suggests an alternative approach
to alleviate that problem. 14
I. HISTORICAL BASIS OF TRADE SECRET LAW
Trade secret protection originated in the first century' when the def-
inition of "plagium"' 6 expanded to encompass the pirating of literary
works. 7 Throughout ancient history, the law strictly curtailed the dis-
semination of trade secrets. The Romans used slavery to control the
descent of trade secrets.'" During the Middle Ages the guild system
evolved, under which only guild members were entrusted with trade
secrets.' 9 By the seventeenth century, statutory protection for some
types of intellectual property had begun to develop. 0
In contrast to the stringent protection historically afforded trade
secrets, current American law offers little protection. Although the
framers of the Constitution explicitly provided for patents and copy-
rights, they failed to include protection for trade secrets.2' In the ab-
12. See infra notes 72-117 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 118-138 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 139-140 and accompanying text.
15. B. BUGBEE, THE GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 13 (1967).
16. "Plagium" is derived from the Latin word for kidnapping. VII OxFoRD ENGLISH Dic-
TIONARY 932 (1933).
17. B. BUGBEE, supra note 15.
18. Schiller, Trade Secrets andthe Roman Law, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 837, 838-39 (1930). Ro-
man law granted relief to a master if a slave betrayed a secret to a third party. Id
19. Harris & Siegel, Trade Secrets in the Context of Positive Competition, 10 IDEA 297, 312
(1966). Strict enforcement of this rule sometimes caused trade secrets to disappear with the death
of the last member of the guild. Id.
20. These statutes consisted primarily of grants of individual monopolies under private bene-
fit legislation. Historians trace the beginning of patent law to this time period, when statutes
generally prohibited monopolies but reserved monopolies for inventors' licensed inventions. An
Act Concerning Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac., ch. 3 §§ I-XIV. These early statutory protections as-
sisted individuals in competing against the guild monopolies. ABRAHAMSON, THE PATENT SYS-
TEM: ITS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BASIS, Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights,
Study No. 26, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). Almost a century
later, Parliament enacted the first statutory copyright protection. An Act Vesting the Copies of
Printed Books in the Authors of Such Copies, 1709, 8 Anne ch. 19 §§ I-XI.
21. The Constitution explicitly grants Congress the power "To promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful acts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries," U.S CONsT. art I, § 8, cl. 8. Federal law controls
patent protection. See Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); see also
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sence of constitutional or statutory regulation, trade secret protection in
the United States arose from the common law. 22
The decision in Peabody v. Norfolk23 marks the beginning of Ameri-
can trade secret law.24 In Peabody, the plaintiff's decedent successfully
developed a unique manufacturing process. He hired a machinist, the
infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text. Federal law also controls copyright protection. See
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-810 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); see also infra notes 83-88 and
accompanying text.
22. The common law of trade secrets and the statutory regulation of patents and copyrights
co-existed peacefully in American law for over a century. Courts did not consider the possibility
that federal patent and copyright statutes preempt state trade secret law until the Supreme Court
decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), and Compeo Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). In Sears-Compco the Supreme Court held that federal
patent law preempted the state common law of unfair competition. 376 U.S. at 229. The Court
found preemption justified even though "the state law [was] enacted in the exercise of otherwise
undoubted state power." Id.
The Sears-Compco decision caused uncertainty in the lower courts over the continued effect and
scope of state trade secret law. Consequently, some courts refused to grant relief when they be-
lieved that local trade secret law was preempted under Sears-Compco. See, e.g., Winston Re-
search Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965); Titelock Carpet Strip
Co. v, Klasner, 142 U.S.P.Q. 405 (Cal. Super. Ct. !964). Most courts, however, continued to grant
relief in all meritorious trade secret actions. See, e.g., Dekar Indus., Inc. v. Bissett-Berman Corp.,
434 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 945 (1971) (applying state law); Servo Corp. v.
General Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 934 (1966) (applying state
law); Components for Research, Inc. v. Isolation Prods., Inc., 241 Cal. App. 2d 726, 50 Cal. Rptr.
829 (1966); Schulenburg v. Signatrol, 33 IlL. 2d 379, 212 N.E.2d 865 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
959 (1966).
After a decade of confusion the Supreme Court settled the federal preemption issue in Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). In Kewanee, the Court held that federal patent law
does not preempt state trade secret law, even if a plaintiff could acquire patent protection for some
of the material in question. Id. at 474. Since Kewanee, courts have consistently ruled against
claims that state trade secret law is preempted by the federal copyright laws. See, e.g., Truck
Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976)
(design of truck trailer protectable under state law, even though protectable under federal copy-
right law), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Time Mechanism, Inc. v. Qonaar Corp., 422 F. Supp.
905 (D.N.J. 1976) (design of parking meter protectable under state law even though not protect-
able under federal copyright law).
Similarly, in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 569 (1973), the Court ruled that federal
copyright law did not prohibit California from banning the copying of records and tapes made
before February 15, 1972, the date Congress amended the federal copyright statute to include
these items. See Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7)
(1976)). See also Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979) (state has the right to
enforce royalty payments under a trade secret agreement even though the licensee's production
and sale of the item has placed it in the public domain).
23. 98 Mass. 452 (1868).
24. C. McMANIS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR TRADE PRAcTIcES 282 (1982); Harris & Siegel,
supra note 19, at 305; Note, Industrial Secrets and the Skilled Employee, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 324,
324 (1963).
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defendant, to help him implement the process. The defendant became
intimately acquainted with the process and promised by contract not to
disclose the secret process or any information pertaining to it.25 Subse-
quently, the machinist began working for another entrepreneur and
used the secret process in his factory. The developer's heir sued both
the former employee and the entrepreneur, seeking an injunction
against their use of the process. 26
The Peabody court discussed several possible bases for trade secret
protection, including protection as a property interest; protection as the
subject of an employment contract restricting future disclosure; and,
absent a contract, protection as the subject of a confidential relation-
ship.27 The court ultimately relied on the plaintiff's proprietary interest
in the secret process to enjoin its use by both defendants .2  Today,
courts use all the rationales first enunciated in Peabody to protect trade
secrets.
II. THE THEORETICAL BASIS FOR PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS
Many of the difficulties that arise with respect to trade secret protec-
tion stem from the problem of how to conceptualize a trade secret. A
majority of courts classify trade secrets as property. 9
In EL DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland,30 however, Jus-
tice Holmes suggested that courts consider the confidential relationship
of the parties as an alternative ground for trade secret protection. One
25. 98 Mass. at 453.
26. Id. at 454.
27. The court stated:
[one who develops] a process of manufacture, whether a proper subject for patent or not,
... has a property in it, which a court of chancery will protect against one who in
violation of contract and breach of confidence undertakes to apply it to his own use, or to
disclose it to third persons.
Id at 458. At the time Peabody was decided, law and equity still existed separately. The defend-
ant alleged that the executors had no standing to sue because no inheritable interest existed in the
trade secret. To overcome this allegation and grant equitable relief, the court found a proprietary
interest in the trade secret. Subsequent courts have attributed other property rights to trade
secrets. See, e.g., Lapin v. LaMaur, Inc., 11 F.R.D. 339 (D. Minn. 1951) (may be licensed); Chad-
wick v. Covell, 151 Mass. 190, 23 N.E. 1068 (1890) (may be sold); Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Ameri-
can Can Co., 67 N.J. Eq. 243, 58 A. 290 (Ch. 1904) (may be assigned), rey'don other ground, 72
N.J Eq. 387, 67 A. 339 (N.J. 1970).
28. Id. at 455.
29. Approximately thirty states have adopted the conceptualization of a trade secret as a
property right. See 12 R. MiLORim, BusiNEss ORGANIZATIOMNS § 1.01[2], at 1-7 n.15 (1982).
30. 244 U.S. 100 (1917).
31. Id. at 102. Justice Holmes stated:
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commentator finds the cases which base trade secret protection upon
breach of a confidential relationship consistent with the property char-
acterization because the courts could not grant relief to the holder in
these latter cases unless he possessed property which courts could pro-
tect.32 Other commentators, however, urge that Masland dismissed the
proprietary view.3 3 These commentators argue that confidential busi-
ness information only acquires protection as a trade secret when it
arises from a confidential relationship.34 The fundamental precept of
"fairness" underlies the rationale of both the proprietary and the confi-
dential relationship theories. While courts disagree on the proper ra-
tionale,35 they unanimously agree that the law will not allow parties to
The word property as applied to trademarks and trade secrets is an unanalyzed expres-
sion of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law makes some
rudimentary requirements of good faith. Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret
or not the defendant knows the facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence he
accepted. The property may be demanded but the confidence cannot be. Therefore the
starting point for the present matter is not the property or due process of the law, but that
the defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs, or one of them.
Id.
32. 12 R. MILGRIM, supra note 29, § 1.08, at 1-38 n.4. For commentators who support the
proprietary view see: RESTATEMENT (SECOND) LAW OF TRUSTS § 82 comment d (1959); 2 R.
CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE MARKS § 14.02 (4th ed. 1982); 1 H. NIMs, UN-
FAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 141, at 402 (4th ed. 1947); 4 R. POWELL, REAL PROP-
ERTY 512, at 75, 76 n.13, 598, at 589 n.9 (1954); 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1645 (3d ed.
1972).
33. 9A Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 233.0113], at 233-18 to -32 & nn. 30-36
(1981); R. ELLIS, TRADE SECRETS § 6, at 12 (1953 ed.); A. TURNER, THE LAW OF TRADE SECRETS
§ 3, at 12 (1962); Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 4, 21 (1962). See also Correa, Protec-
tion ofTrade Secrets, 18 Bus. LAW. 531, 532 (1963); Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts,
77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 948, 949 (1964).
34. See supra note 33.
35. Earlier cases often relied on the proprietary rationale of protecting the discovery. See,
e.g., Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 461 (1868); Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30,35, 23 N.E. 12,
12 (1889). More recent cases focused on the relationship of the parties. These courts used breach
of confidence, unfair competition and implied contract theories as bases for relief. See, e.g.,
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974) (breach of confidence); E.I. DuPont de
Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 101 (1917) (same); Servo Corp. of Am. v. General
Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 716, 724-25 (4th Cir. 1964) (same), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 934 (1966); Warner-
Lambert Pharmaceutical Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 280 F.2d 197, 197 (2d Cir. 1960) (implied
contract); Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1953) (breach of confidence); Schreyer
v. Casco Prods. Corp., 190 F.2d 921, 924 (2d Cir. 1951) (unfair competition), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
913 (1952); American Dirigold Corp. v. Dirigold Metals Corp., 125 F.2d 446, 522-53 (6th Cir.
1942) (implied contract); Stone v. Goss, 65 N.J. Eq. 756, 756, 55 A. 736, 736 (N.J. 1903) (same);
Cameron Mach. Co. v. Samuel M. Langston Co., 115 A. 212, 214-15 (N.J. Ch. 1921) (same). For
cases involving express contractual protection, see infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
Washington University Open Scholarship
828 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 61:823
"reap where they have not sown."36
III. TRADE SECRETS DEFINED
Although the theoretical basis of trade secret protection varies
among the courts, the vast majority agree that the Restatement of Torts
contains the most accurate definition of a trade secret: Any process or
information which gives the possessor an "opportunity to obtain an ad-
vantage" over his competitor, and which does not constitute public
knowledge.37
Drawing on the definition provided by the Restatement, courts have
developed factors which help determine the existence of trade secrets.
These factors include: the degree of secrecy involved inside and
outside the firm; the methods used to protect the secret; the value of the
secret to the firm's business and to its competitors; the extent of money,
time and effort invested in developing the information that constitutes
the secret; and the degree of difficulty by which another could attain
36. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918).
Justice Holmes first expressed the fundamental fairness concept in Board of Trade v. Christie
Grain Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905): "The plaintiff has the right to keep the work which it has done, or
paid for doing, to itself. The fact that others might do similar work, if they wished, does not
authorize them to steal plaintiff's." Id. at 250. See also Pachmayr Gun Works, Inc. v. Olin Math-
ieson Chem. Corp., 502 F.2d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1974), in which the court stated, "it appears settled
that the law of trade secrets is essentially concerned with protecting 'against breach of faith and
reprehensible means of learning another's secret."' (quoting 4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757
comment b, at 7 (1939)). See generally R. ELLIS, supra note 33, § 12, at 19.
37. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939). Twenty eight states and all federal
circuits accept this definition. 12 R. MILGRIM, supra note 29, § 2.01 n.2. THE RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS excludes this section and, in fact, all of the chapter which formerly covered
unfair competition and trade regulation. The reporters explained:
[U]nfair competition and trade regulation were rapidly developing into independent
bodies of law with diminishing reliance upon the traditional principles of Tort Law. ...
If it should be later decided that the law on these subjects ought to be restated it will be
done by separate restatements on the subjects involved.
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS commentary at 1 (1979). See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Lindley,
609 P.2d 733, 743 n.4 (Okla. 1980) (recognizing Reporter's rationale for exclusion but stating that
"tort premises are nonetheless an integral part of the developed case law of trade secrets"). But
see Sims v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 1068, 1070 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (although acknowledge-
ment trade secret and unfair competition claims have basis in different legal theories, dismissing
trade secret action as it had dismissed unfair competition action).
In Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 342 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.
1965), the court similarly defined trade secrets: "[A] trade secret can exist in a combination of
characteristics and components, each of which, by itself, is in the public domain, but the unified
process, design or operation of which, in unique combination, affords a competitive advantage
and is a protectable secret." id. at 742.
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38the information by proper means.
A trade secret need not be unique and may be clearly anticipated in
"prior art."39 Nevertheless, it must afford the holder an opportunity to
obtain a competitive advantage.4" Additionally, the information or
process for which trade secret protection is sought must not be common
knowledge within the industry or among the general public.4' While
novelty may help the possessor in proving the existence of a trade se-
cret, it does not in itself constitute the basis of protection. Instead,
courts base trade secret protection upon breach of confidentiality or
unfair means of acquisition.42
Although the law of trade secrets does not require a discovery, some
courts confuse the "advantage in the industry" requirement with uni-
queness in the sense of discovery. Courts which mistakenly import
such a requirement test the discovery by a standard which barely falls
short of the uniqueness requirement necessary to establish patentabil-
38, See 4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment v (1939) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT].
An exact definition of a trade secret is not possible. Some facts to be considered in
determining whether given information is one's trade secret are: (1) the extent to which
the information is known outside of his business; (2) the extent to which it is known by
employees and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to
guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and to his
competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the infor-
mation; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired
or duplicated by others.
Id,
39. Prior art means existing technology. A change which is "clearly anticipated in prior art"
means a change or development which only minimally improves or alters the existing technology.
4 RESTATEMENT, .upra note 38, comment b, at 6-7.
40. Organic Chem., Inc. v. Carroll Prod., Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. 628, 630-31 (W.D. Mich. 1981);
Pressure Science, Inc. v. Kramer, 413 F. Supp. 618, 626-27 (D. Conn.), a 'd without opinion, 551
F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976); Cudahy Co. v. American Laboratories, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1339, 1342 (D.
Neb. 1970); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Pentronix, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 910, 913 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Continental Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645, 653 (E.D. Mich.
1966).
41. Sperry Rand Corp. v. Pentronix, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 910, 913 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Fortna v.
Martin, 158 Cal. App. 2d 634, 640, 323 P.2d 146, 149 (1958); Victor Chem. Works v. Iliff, 299 Inl.
532, 546-47, 132 N.E. 806, 812 (1921).
As technical information approaches pure science it comes closer to purely abstract ideas which
should be part of the public domain. Similarly, it leaves the realm of employer's property and
becomes a part of the intellect of the employee.
42. See. e.g.. Booth v. Stutz Motor Car Co. of Am., 56 F.2d 962, 968 (7th Cir. 1932);
Comibert v. Cohn, 169 Misc. 285, 287, 7 N.Y.S.2d 351, 354 (Sup. Ct. 1938). See generaily RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 38, comment b, at 7 (Reporter's note that lack of novelty may limit de-
fendant's liability to damages only, precluding injunctive relief).
Washington University Open Scholarship
830 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 61:823
ity.43 The prevailing view, however, is that patentability is not a pre-
requisite to trade secret protection."
For a protectable trade secret to exist, the owner must not only fulfill
a secrecy requirement with regard to persons outside of his control,4
but must also fulfill a secrecy requirement as to persons within the
firm. 6 This internal secrecy requirement imposes an obligation on the
employer to exercise reasonable precautionary measures to protect con-
fidential information. The employer must develop and implement pro-
cedures which demonstrate to the employee the importance of not
disclosing the information.47 Adequate precautionary measures may
consist of confidentiality agreements,4 reminders of confidentiality 49
43. See Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250, 265 (S.D. Cal. 1958)
(while trade secrets "need not amount to an invention, in the patent law sense, they must at least
amount to discovery"), af'd, 283 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961). See
also Smoley v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 106 F.2d 314 (3d Cir. 1939); Berry v. Gliddon Co., 92 F.
Supp. 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); De Filippis v. Chrysler Corp., 53 F. Supp. 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), aj'd,
159 F.2d 478 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 848 (1947).
44. 4 RESTATEMENT, supra note 38.
For cases clearly distinguishing trade secret protection from patent protection, see Franke v.
Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1953); Shellmar Prods. Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 36 F.2d
623, 625 (7th Cir. 1929); By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane Tape Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 157, 165-
66, 329 P.2d 147, 152 (1958).
Cases in which courts have granted trade secret protection while invalidating patents for lack of
novelty also illustrate this distinction. See, e.g., Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 380-81 (7th
Cir. 1953); Schreyer v. Casco Prods. Corp., 190 F.2d 921, 923-24 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 913 (1952); A.O. Smith Corp.-v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 1934),
modified, 74 F.2d 934 (1935); Booth v. Stutz Motor Car Co. of Am., 56 F.2d 962, 963, 968 (7th Cir,
1932); Trenton Indus. v. A.E. Peterson Mfg. Co., 165 F. Supp. 523, 528-29, 532 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
45. See 9A Z. CAVTCH, supra note 33, § 232.01[1][b] (this element of the secrecy requirement
labelled "external" secrecy).
46. See id § 232.01[1][a] (this element labelled "internal" secrecy).
47. Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Tubbs Mfg. Co., 216 F. 401, 407 (W.D. Mich. 1908); Aetna Bldg.
Maintenance Co. v. West, 39 Cal. 2d 198, 206, 246 P.2d 11, 16 (1952).
48. See Sperry Rand Corp. v. Pentronix, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 910, 917-18 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (em-
ployees signed enforceable nondisclosure agreements); cf. Republic Sys. & Programming, Inc. v.
Computer Assistance, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 619, 628 (D. Conn. 1970) (unenforceable employment
agreements, lax precautions, and public dissemination of information by plaintiff), alj'd 440 F.2d
996 (2d Cir. 1971).
49. See Telex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 330 (N.D.
Okla. 1973) (reminder of confidentiality by extensive security measures and exit interviews), rev'd
on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Comshare, Inc. v.
Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229, 1232, 1234 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (same), afj'd, 458 F.2d
1341 (6th Cir. 1972); cf. Motorola, Inc. v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 366 F. Supp.
1173, 1185-86 (D. Ariz. 1973) (secret fully revealed in patent application and employee not specifi-
cally warned of importance of confidentiality).
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and numerous security measures.5 0
If the owner publicly discloses confidential information, he may not
impose conditions of secrecy on his employees." Nevertheless, limited
disclosure to employees and others52 in a confidential relationship with
the owner does not destroy trade secret protection. 3
Similarly, public disclosure by the sale of a product embodying the
trade secret in a non-obvious manner does not relieve an existing obli-
gation of confidentiality. 4 Some courts have extended the employee's
obligation of confidentiality to situations in which the owner disclosed
the trade secret by means other than sale." Other courts have refused
to grant trade secret protection in this circumstance, however, on the
50. See Telex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 330 (N.D.
Okla. 1973) (magnetic door locks; information designated as confidential; guards; television cam-
eras; safes and computer controlled access systems), rei'd on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10th
Cir.) cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Comshare, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F.
Supp. 1229, 1232, 1234 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (information designated confidential; safes; intra-system
passwords), a]f'd, 458 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1972).
51. See Skoog v. McCray Refrigerator Co., 211 F.2d 254, 257 (7th Cir. 1954); Sperry Rand
Corp. v. Pentronix, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 910, 918 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Wissman v. Boucher, 150 Tex. 326,
330. 240 S.W.2d 278, 279-80 (1951).
52. "Others" refers to those who have a contractual right or permission of the owner to use
the trade secret, but who do not work for the owner. See infra note 53.
53 Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 247 (1905) (distribution to
1800 members of commodity exchange did not impair validity of trade secret); Data General
Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., 357 A.2d 105, 108 (Del. Ch. 1975) (distribution to 6000
vendors and customers who signed secrecy agreements did not impair validity of trade secret).
54. See Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919, 923 (D. Md. 1958) (although ski
publicly available, defendants learned its composition from working for plaintiff, not by reverse
engineering); Maas & Waldstein Co. v. Walker, 100 N.J. Eq. 224, 229, 135 A. 275, 277 (1926)
(chemical formulas for lacquers were generally known, but plaintiffs variations were secret and
warranted protection), afl'dper curiam, 102 N.J. Eq. 328, 140 A. 921 (N.J. 1928); Stone v. Goss, 65
N J. Eq. 756, 760, 55 A. 736, 738 (N.J. 1903) (where general ingredients of chemical formula
generally known, but particular combination not generally known, plaintiff entitled to trade secret
protection); Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 37, 23 N.E. 12, 13 (1889) (public sale of pump did not
make secret pattern for pump mold public); Extrin Foods, Inc. v. Leighton, 202 Misc. 592, 597,
115 N.Y.S.2d 429, 433 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (inclusion of ingredients on plaintiffs product label does
not preclude trade secret protection); cf. Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Carter Prods., Inc., 230 F.2d
855, 865 (4th Cir. 1956) (because technical process well-known in industry, defendant not liable
for misappropriation of process even though he learned of it from former employer and communi-
cated it to new employer).
55. Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 247 (1905) (distribution to
1800 members of commodity exchange); Sun Dial Corp. v. Rideout, 16 N.J. 252, 256, 108 A.2d
442, 446 (1954) (revealed in trade magazine article); L.M. Rabinowitz & Co., Inc. v. Dasher, 82
N.Y.S.2d 431, 437-38 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (machines leased and visitors allowed inside plant). See also
California Intelligence Bureau v. Cunningham, 83 Cal. App. 2d 197, 204, 188 P.2d 303, 306-08
(1948) (dicta) (formerly disseminated information still protected).
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theory of abandonment. 6 If an employee cannot prove that the owner
intended to abandon the trade secret, the court must determine the
amount of confidential information which still warrants protection. 7
Courts also consider the effort incurred in initially developing an
item of confidential business information when attempting to deter-
mine if trade secret protection is warranted. 8 A finding that substan-
tial effort was required to develop confidential information militates in
favor of extending trade secret protection. If such a finding is made, a
majority of courts grant trade secret protection even if appropriated
information could be acquired easily by experimentation or reverse
engineering. 9
The lack of a single conceptual basis for trade secret protection and
the inconsistent application of its constituent elements has created con-
fusion among courts; adding the variable of employee disclosure fur-
ther complicates trade secret protection analysis.
56. Abandonment occurs when the owner no longer intends to exert his legal right to protect
confidential material. Timely Prods. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1975); Underwater
Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 371 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911
(1967); Note, Protection and Use of Trade Secrets, 64 HARv. L. Rv. 976, 977 (1951).
One court inferred the owner's intent to abandon a trade secret when he unconditionally sold a
product which revealed allegedly secret information. William A. Meier Glass Co. v. Anchor
Hocking Glass Corp., 95 F. Supp. 264, 267 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
57. This question must be decided as a factual matter. See Note, supra note 56, at 977.
58. The "effort expended" includes the expense and time invested in developing the informa-
tion. Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 245 (1905); Lee v. Samburn, 94
U.S.P.Q. 153, 156 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1952).
59. Smith v. Diavo Corp., 203"F.2d 369, 374 (7th Cir. 1953). See Franke v. Wiltschek, 209
F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1953); A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 538-39
(6th Cir. 1934), modefed 74 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1935); International Indus., Inc. v. Warren Petro-
leum Corp., 99 F. Supp. 907, 913-14 (D. Del. 1951); By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane Tape Co.,
163 Cal. App. 2d 157, 166-67, 329 P.2d 147, 152-53 (1958); Extrin Foods, Inc. v. Leighton, 202
Misc. 592, 597, 115 N.Y.S.2d 429, 433 (Sup. Ct. 1952); K & G Tool & Serv. Co. v. G&G Fishing
Tool Serv., 158 Tex. 594, 602, 314 S.W.2d 782, 787 (1958).
A minority of courts have refused to grant protection when reverse engineering easily reveals
the confidential information. These courts reason that the employee's right to practice a profes-
sion outweighs the owner's right to protection. Continental Car-Na-Var Corp. v. Moseley, 24 Cal.
2d 104, 148 P.2d 9 (1944); Levine v. E. A. Johnson & Co., 107 Cal. App. 2d 322, 237 P.2d 309
(1951); New Method Die & Cut-Out Co. v. Milton Bradley Co., 289 Mass. 277, 194 N.E. 80 (1935);
Richard M. Krause, Inc. v. Gardner, 99 N.Y.S.2d 592 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
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IV. TRADE SECRET PROTECTION AND THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP
4. Generally
Employers may protect their trade secrets either by exacting a non-
disclosure contract from each key employee,60 or by relying on the
common law of agency.6' Under the common law of agency, the em-
ployee has a duty not to reveal any confidential information which he
acquired through his employment.62 Confidential information is held
in trust for the employer.63 When the agency relationship ends, the
former agent may freely compete with the former employer as long as
he does not use trade secret information acquired in the course of the
former employment.'
Courts have had difficulty, however, balancing the employee's right
to change jobs with the employer's interest in protecting trade secrets
60. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., Westervelt v. National Paper & Supply Co., 154 Ind. 673, 678-79, 57 N.E. 552,
554 (1900); Space Aero Prods. Co. v. R.E. Darling Co., Inc., 238 Md. 93, 115, 208 A.2d 74, 85, cert.
denied. 382 U.S. 843 (1965).
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 395 (1958). See, e.g., International Election Sys.
Corp. v. Shoup, 452 F. Supp. 684, 705-06 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Crocan Corp. v. Sheller-Globe Corp.,
385 F. Supp. 251, 253 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Textile Rubber & Chem. Co. v. Shook, 243 Ga. 587, 589,
255 SE. 2d 705, 707 (1979); Packard Instrument Co. v. Reich, 89 Ill. App. 3d 908, 916-17, 412
N.E.2d 617, 623 (1980); Scott & Fetzer Co. v. Khan, 74 Ill. App. 3d 400, 406, 393 N.E.2d 102, 106
(1979); Auxton Computer Enters., Inc. v. Parker, 174 N.J. Super. 418, 423, 416 A.2d 952, 955
(App. Div. 1980).
63. Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1953); By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane
Tape Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 157, 164-65, 329 P.2d 147, 151 (1958); Allen Mgf. Co. v. Loika, 145
Conn. 509, 512-13, 144 A.2d 306, 309 (1958); Taylor Iron & Steel Co. v. Nichols, 73 N.J. Eq. 684,
685, 65 A. 695, 696 (Ch. 1907); Extrin Foods v. Leighton, 202 Misc. 592, 593, 115 N.Y.S.2d 429,
434 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Rubner v. Gurnsky, 21 N.Y.S.2d 558, 561 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Stimson Lumber
Co. v. Laurence-David, Inc., 224 Or. 447, 449-50, 356 P.2d 84, 86 (1960).
64. See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 comment f (1958); 4 RESTATEMENT,
supra note 38, § 757(c); By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane Tape Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 157, 164-
65, 329 P.2d 147, 151 (1958); Stone v. Goss, 65 N.J. Eq. 756, 759-60, 55 A. 736, 737-38 (N.J. 1903).
Cf Herold v. Herold China & Pottery Co., 257 F. 911, 913 (6th Cir. 1919) (injunctive relief avail-
able to prevent use of confidential information by third party); Cornibert v. Cohn, 169 Misc. 285,
286-87, 7 N.Y.S.2d 351, 353-54 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (same).
As long as the employee acts fairly, he may not only compete in the same business as his former
employer but may even transact business with the former employer's customers. See Continental
Car-Na-Var Corp. v. Moseley, 24 Cal. 2d 104, 148 P.2d 9 (1944); Ancraft Prods. Co. v. Universal
Oil Prods. Co., 84 I11. App. 3d 836, 405 N.E.2d 1162 (1980); Tad, Inc. v. Siebert, 63 Ill. App. 3d
1001, 380 N.E.2d 963 (1978); Auxton Computer Enters. Inc. v. Parker, 174 N.J. Super. 418, 416
A.2d 952 (App. Div. 1980); 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra. See also 12 R. MIL-
GRIM, supra note 29, at § 5.0213], at 5-21 n.29.
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under the common law of agency.65 Because the common law recog-
nizes the former employee's right to practice any chosen calling, an
employer may not unreasonably restrain the manner in which an em-
ployee uses knowledge, skill and experience acquired during his em-
ployment.66 The employee does not incur liability, therefore, when the
former employer merely alleges that the employee's general skill and
knowledge "belonged" to the employer as a trade secret.67 When the
employee's skill, knowledge, and experience are inextricably combined
with the employer's trade secrets, however, the question of liability be-
comes more difficult to determine. The former employer may not com-
pletely enjoin the former employee from seeking employment in the
same field.6 8 Nevertheless, if the former employer proves that he will
suffer irreparable damage if the former employee uses particular
knowledge or skills, courts will usually enjoin the employee from re-
vealing that information.
69
65. Public policy favors free competition by giving the employee a right to use his skill and
knowledge for his own benefit and for the benefit of the public. On the other hand, courts wish to
promote inventiveness by protecting employer's trade secrets from misappropriation. See C.
McMANIS, supra note 24. See also U.S CON ST. Art I, § 8, cl. 8 (patent clause protects inventive-
ness while promoting free competition).
66. Levine v. E. A. Johnson & Co., 107 Cal. App, 2d 322, 325, 237 P.2d 309, 312 (1951);
Donahue v. Permacel Tape Corp., 234 Ind. 398, 412, 127 N.E.2d 235, 240 (1955) (dictum); Roy v.
Bolduc, 140 Me. 103, 107, 34 A.2d 479, 481 (1943) (dictum); Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 76, 78,
67 N.E.2d 667, 669 (1946); Wireless Specialty Apparatus Co. v. Mica Condenser Co., 239 Mass.
158, 161-62, 131 N.E. 307, 308 (1921); Richard M. Krause, Inc. v. Gardner, 99 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595
(Sup. Ct. 1950); Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp. v. Cox, 50 N.Y.S.2d 643, 650-51 (Sup. Ct.
1944). See also 12 R. MILGRIM, supra note 29, § 5.02131, at 5-17 n.28.
67. Wilson Certified Foods, Inc. v. Fairbury Foods Prods., Inc., 370 F. Supp. 1081, 1083 (D.
Neb. 1974); Midland-Ross Corp. v. Sunbeam Equip. Corp., 316 F. Supp. 171, 177 (W.D. Pa.), ajj'd
per curiam, 435 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1970); Cudahy Co. v. American Laboratories, Inc., 313 F. Supp.
1339, 1345 (D. Neb. 1970); Koehring Co. v. National Automatic Tool Co., 257 F. Supp. 282, 290
(S.D. Ind. 1966), a f'dper curiam, 385 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1967); Gabriel Co. v. Talley Indus., 137
U.S.P.Q. 630 (D. Ariz. 1963); Berkshire Apparel Co. v. Stogel, 360 Mass. 863, 277 N.E.2d 310
(1971); Kidde Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Peirson, 493 S.W.2d 326, 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
68. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 499, 192 N.E.2d 99, 105
(1963) (enjoined from revealing particular details of plaintiffs spacesuit manufacturing process);
Trilog Assoc., Inc. v. Famularo, 455 Pa. 243, 250-56, 314 A.2d 287, 291-94 (1974) (court carefully
distinguished between permissible use of general knowledge gained while working at former em-
ployer's business and impermissible use of specific confidential information acquired in this fash-
ion).
A few courts have refused to grant the former employer any relief, even though he could prove
that he confidentially imparted the knowledge or skill to his former employee. See Reed, Roberts
Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303, 308-09, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593-94, 386 N.Y.S.2d 677, 680-
81 (1976) (former employer cannot restrain former employee from using unique variation of gen-
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Because of the uncertainty of common law protection, employers
often acquire protection through contracts which limit the employee's
right to disclose confidential information. Courts usually find nondis-
closure agreements valid and enforceable.7" If the agreement is not
reasonably necessary to protect the employer's interest, however, courts
will find it invalid.7 1
B. Trade Secret Protection in the Computer Industry Employment
Relationship
The difficulties employers encounter in attempting to protect their
trade secrets are particularly acute in the computer industry. The prob-
lem of protecting computer hardware72 and computer software73 from
acquisition by competing firms has caused considerable debate among
commentators.74  Since the mid-1940's the computer industry has
eral practice); Sybron Corp. v. Wetzel, 61 A.D.2d 697, 702-04, 403 N.Y.S.2d 931, 934-35 (former
employer cannot restrain former employee from using highly specialized skill which he learned
during 34 years of employment with plaintiff), modfed, 46 N.Y.2d 197, 385 N.E.2d 1055, 413
N.Y.S.2d 127 (1978); Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 575, 160 A.2d 430, 433 (1970) (former
employer cannot restrain former employee from using formulas which he reverse engineered for
plaintiff in his new employment with plaintiffs competitor, formulas held to be within defendant's
knowledge, skill and experience); Lamons Metal Gasket Co. v. Traylor, 135 U.S.P.Q. 231, 232
(Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (former employer cannot restrain former employee from using machines he
developed which did not qualify as trade secrets).
70. Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549, 564 (D. Conn. 1964); Julias Hyman &
Co. v. Velsicol Corp., 123 Colo. 563, 587, 233 P.2d 977, 1002, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 870 (1951);
Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 453-54 (1868); O.&W. Thum Co. v. Tloczynski, 114 Mich. 149,
160-61, 72 N.W. 140, 144 (1897); Stone v. Goss, 65 N.J. Eq. 756, 759, 55 A. 736, 736-37 (N.J. 1903);
Clark Paper & Mfg. Co. v. Stenacher, 236 N.Y. 312, 317-18, 140 N.E. 708, 711 (1923).
71. See, e.g., Julias Hyman & Co. v. Velsicol Corp., 123 Col. 563, 587, 233 P.2d 977, 1001-02,
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 870 (1951); Taylor Iron & Steel Co. v. Nichols, 73 N.J. Eq. 684, 685, 69 A.
186, 187 (N.J. 1908).
72. The machinery components of the computer system constitute the computer hardware
(e.g. printer, disk-drive, tape drive, etc.). Note, Protection of Computer Software - A Hard Prob-
lem. 26 DRAKE L. REV. 180, 180 n.1 (1977).
73. The term computer software refers to computer programs. "A [computer] program is a
set of instructions for carrying out prearranged operations on data by use of processing equip-
ment." In re Ghiron, 442 F.2d 985, 986 (C.C.P.A. 1971). The computer program is the concept,
method or process which belongs to the employer. Id. See generally B. MEEK & S. FAIRTHOUSE,
USING COMPUTERS 58 (1977).
74. See, e.g., D. BROOKS, COMPUTER LAW, PURCHASING, LEASING AND LICENSING HARD-
WARE, SOFTWARE, AND SERVICES 17-27 (1980); Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software, 38
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 909, 909 (1970); Bigelow, Legal Protection of Software: A Matter of Monu-
mental InsignicanceZ [1978] 3 COMPUTER LAW SERV. (Callaghan) § 4-1, art. 5, at 120; Kesler &
Hardy, Legal Protection of Software in the United States: .4 Status Report, 10 INT'L BUS. LAW. 266,
266 (1982); Davidson, Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis, 23 JURIMETRiCS
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grown substantially.75 As software increasingly replaces hardware
functions,76 research and development incentives continue to rise in the
software industry.77 Unfortunately, with this rapid expansion of tech-
nology has come an equally rapid increase in software misappropria-
tion by employees and users.78
J. 340, 386 (1983); Milgrim, Protecting andLicensing Software, reprintedin 12A R. MILORIM, supra
note 29, app. A-I, at A-i-1 to Al-2 (1982); Pope & Pope, Protection o/Proprietary Interests in
Computer Software, 30 ALA. L. REv. 527, 528-29 (1979); Schmidt, Legal Proprietary Interests in
Computer Programs: The .4merican Experience, 21 JUIMETmCS J. 345, 345-47 (1981).
Congress has even considered the problem. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNICAL
USES OF COPYRIGHrTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT, July 31, 1978, reprinted in 12A R. MILGRIM,
supra note 29, at app. B-3.
75. Scientists developed the first electronic computer using vacuum tubes in 1946. This com-
puter used hard-wire control boards and machine code (i.e., only hardware) to program the com-
puter. See supra note 1.
In the early 1950's, Remington and IBM each developed a commercial computer using some
internal programs written in symbolic code (i.e. software). Brooks, Pefecting and Protecting
Rights in Employee Inventions, in COMPUTER FINANCE AND LEASING: RECENT TRENDS IN FI-
NANCING AND MARKETING 611, 621 (M. Berwind ed. 1982). During this period manufacturers
"gave away" the software as part of the hardware package. Id. at 621-22. In 1969, the practice of
giving software away ended as firms which manufactured only software moved into the field.
Since that year, the software industry has expanded remarkably. Due to this rapid expansion,
figures are difficult to acquire. One author estimated, however, that the industry only spent $3
billion developing computer software in 1967. Kayton, Foreward to SOFTWARE PROTECTION at I
(Patent Group ed. 1969). In 1976, experts estimated the value of computer programs in use at
approximately $43.1 billion, and projected the figure to rise to $79.7 billion by 1980. Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 587 n.7 (1978) (based on Brief for Computer & Business Manufacturing
Association as Amicus Curiae).
76. Prior to 1975, software accounted for only 10-20% of the cost of a computer with a main
frame system. Brooks, supra note 75, at 622. With the development in 1975 of the micro-com-
puter, software costs increased to 30-40% of the total cost of a system. Id. As the hardware size
decreases, software absorbs its tasks, thereby increasing its share of the costs. In the next five
years, analysts expect hardware costs to drop by 80% as software continues to replace hardware
functions. Id.
Today's microcomputer, at a cost of perhaps $300, has more computing capacity than the
first large electronic computer, ENIAC. It is 20 times faster, has a larger memory, is
thousands of times more reliable, consumes the power of a light bulb rather than that of
a locomotive, occupies 1/30,000 of the volume and costs 1/10,000 as much.
Noyce, Microelectronics, ScI. AM., Sept. 1977, at 63, 65.
77. "In an industry whose product declines in price by 25 percent a year, the motivation for
doing research and development is clearly high. A year's advantage in introducing a new product
or new process can give a company a 25 percent cost advantage over competing companies."
Noyce, supra note 76, at 68.
There is also an acute shortage of qualified personnel capable of creating and improving com-
puter programs. Today, the industry demands at least 50,000 more programmers than the market
provides each year. Missing Computer Software, Bus. WK., Sept. 1, 1980, at 46-56. Furthermore,
experts project a labor cost increase of 60% over the next five years. Brooks, supra note 75, at 623.
78. See, e.g., 11 Charged in Theft of IBM Disk Designs, COMPUTERWORLD, July 11, 1973, at
27, col. 2; Girl Charged in Program Threat, COMPUTERWORLD, Aug. 1, 1973, at 1, col. 3; More
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Employers have attempted to use patents to protect their software
from misappropriation, but the patentability of software remains un-
certain.79 In the 1970's, the Supreme Court denied patent protection to
computer software.8° More recently, the Court has sustained patents
that possessed a software component. 81 Nevertheless, because the
Court has not expressly overruled earlier decisions denying patent pro-
tection for software, lower courts may continue to deny such protec-
tion. Moreover, many programs lack the elements of novelty and
nonobviousness required by statute82 to attain patent protection.
Employers have also tried to use federal copyright law83 to protect
their software. Before 1980, the protection of computer programs
under the 1976 Copyright Act was questionable.84 In 1980, Congress
Work Neededto Solve Problem ofData Security, COMPUTERWORLD, Supp. May 27, 1970, at 6, col.
1; California Man Charged with Trying to Extort Cash from Control Data, Wall. St. J., Aug, 18,
1982, at 8 col. 4; Pollack, The Bitter War in Computers, N. Y. Times, June 24, 1982, DI, col. 1;
Shannon, Copycatting in the Software Patch, N. Y. Times, May 9, 1982, at 17, col. 1.
79. See Davidson, supra note 74, at 348-60; Rose, Protection of Intellectual Property in Com-
puters and Computer Programs: Recent Developments, 9 PEPP. L. REv. 547, 556-58 (1982).
To acquire patent protection an inventor must demonstrate that the invention is a "new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof', that the invention has not already been thought of by others; and that the invention
was not obvious to one familiar with prior art. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
80. In Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), the Court found that a process for con-
verting binary coded decimal numbers into pure binary numbers performed completely within the
computer did not constitute patentable subject matter. The Court viewed the process as simply a
mathematical algorithm, and analogized it to the unpatentable discovery of a law of nature. Four
years later the Court avoided the patentability issue by declaring that an arguably innovative
computer bookkeeping system could not acquire patent protection because similar systems existed
in prior art. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976). The Court further reinforced this line of
authority in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), in which the claimants had devised a computer
program that applied an algorithm to a problem and then acted to correct the problem. The
Court, relying on Gottschalk, held that the addition of a post-solution activity did not render the
process patentable.
81. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (5-4) (otherwise patentable subject matter
does not become unpatentable simply because it used a mathematical formula, computer or digital
computer); Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas, 448 U.S. 176, 182 (1980) (5-4) (process in-
volving independently unpatentable material validly patented as a herbicide); Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980) (5-4) (man-made micro-organism validly patentable mate-
rial). Cf. In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807, 811 (C.C.P.A. 1979), ajf'd mem. by equally divided court sub
nom. Diamond v. Bradley, 450 U.S. 381 (1981) (4-4 Burger, C.J. abstaining) (not all computer
programs are nonstatutory subject matter).
82. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See supra note 79.
83. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The federal copyright statute protects the
originator's work from duplication by unauthorized persons if it is fixed in any tangible medium
from which it can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated. Id. § 102(c).
84. See Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979)
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expressly amended the 1976 Act85 to include computer programs. 86
This amendment eliminated questions of coverage in situations involv-
ing copying by mechanical methods.87 The amendment did not, how-
ever, solve the problem of protecting programs that did not fulfill the
originality, authorship and fixation requirements of the Act.88
The uncertainty of traditional statutory protection for computer
software has caused many firms to seek trade secret protection. 89 If a
(mechanical copying of registered memory chip for electronic chess game not copyright infringe-
ment), af'd expressly and solel, on grounds of insufficient copyright notice, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir.
1980). In White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Appollo Co., 201 U.S. 1 (1908), the Supreme
Court held that copying sheet music onto a player piano roll did not constitute a copyright in-
fringement. The Court reasoned that the statute was only designed to protect materials from
copying accomplished by eye-readable methods. Because the player piano roll was not readable
by the human eye, no infringement had occurred. Thus, copyright protection for computer prod-
ucts under the 1976 Act was negligible because of the ease with which these products may be
copied by non-eye-readable methods. The registered memory chip in Data Cash Systems was not
eye-readable and was copied by mechanical methods.
85. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 117, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976), amended by 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. IV 1980).
87. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., No. 82-1582 (3d Cir. Aug. 30,
1983) (object code valid subject of copyright protection).
88. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
89. A 1977 survey of software firm executives who belonged to the Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations revealed that these firms considered contractual methods of
protection effective. (See Table 1). Interestingly, however, the firms preferred non-legal, technical
methods of protection. The firms found that using object-code-only programs most effectively
protected their software products. Bigelow, supra note 74. The computer generates object code
from the instructions given it by the programmer. Object code is not intelligible to the lay person
and is specifically adapted to the computer which produced it. Note, supra note 72, at 182-83
nn.25-6 (1977).
TABLE I. EFFECTIVENESS OF SOFTWARE PROTECTION
Weighted Response Percent Effective
Method (Scale of 0-5) Using Use
Patent 0.54 4 2.2
Copyright 1.48 20 29.6
Trade Secret 2.31 21 48.5
Object program 3.54 30 106.2
Know-how 2.46 13 32.0
Cryptography 1.24 40 49.6
Other 3.28 17 55.8
To rate the effectiveness of the methods of protection used, each organization that used a
specific method was asked to categorize the method as follows: not at all effective, rarely
effective, somewhat effective, fairly effective, very effective, completely effective. Table I
shows a weighted average to the response, where not at all effective is "0" and completely
effective is '5'. The second column is the percent using the method, and the third column
is obtained by multiplying the first two together.
Bigelow, supra note 74, at 120 (emphasis in original).
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program affords a firm an opportunity to gain a competitive advantage
in the industry and the firm succeeds in maintaining secrecy, the pro-
gram constitutes a trade secret 9° and may be protected under the com-
mon law of trade secrets.91
While the common law of trade secrets protects software, whether its
protection redounds to the benefit of the employer or employee re-
mains uncertain. Courts addressing this question have uniformly ap-
plied a two part test: whether the computer program deserves trade
secret protection;92 and, whether the employee had a contractual or
common law duty not to disclose the information.9
Although courts apply a uniform test, they reach varying results. Of
the courts which find software protectable as a trade secret, a majority
grant protection to the employer regardless of who developed the pro-
gram.94 A minority of courts that grant software trade secret protec-
90. See supra notes 37-59 and accompanying text.
91. Id.
92. In the following cases, courts found that the software constituted a trade secret: Struc-
tural Dynamics Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1118 (E.D.
Mich. 1975); Telex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 321-24 (N.D.
Okla. 1973),rey'don other grounds, 510 F.2d 894, 929 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 802 (1975);
Corn-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229, 1235 (E.D. Mich. 1971), afl'd, 458
F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Cybertek Computer Prods., Inc. v. Whitfield, 203 U.S.P.Q.
1020, 1022 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1977); Computer Print Sys., Inc. v. Lewis, 281 Pa. Super 240, 250, 422
A.2d 148, 153 (1980); J & K Computer Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 642 P.2d 732, 735 (Utah 1982). In the
following cases, the court concluded that the software did not constitute a trade secret: Electronic
Data Sys. Corp. v. Kinder, 360 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Tex. 1973), aJt'd, 497 F.2d 222, 224 (5th Cir.
1974); National Sur. Corp. v. Applied Sys., Inc., 418 So. 2d 847, 849 (Ala. 1982); Jostens, Inc. v.
National Computer Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691, 699 (Minn. 1982); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Lindley, 609
P.2d 733, 744 (Okla. 1980).
93. For cases in which courts have found such a duty to exist, see Structural Dynamics Corp.
v. Computer Complex, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1112 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (by express contact but not
by confidential relationship); Telex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 367 F. Supp.
258, 323-24 (N.D. Okla. 1973) (both by express contract and by confidential relationship), rev'don
other ground, 510 F.2d 894,929 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Electronic Data Sys.
Corp. v. Kinder, 360 F. Supp. 1044, 1049 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (express contract), a'd, 497 F.2d 222,
224 (5th Cir. 1974); Corn-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229, 1235 (E.D.
Mich. 1971) (express contract), aff'd, 458 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Cybertek Com-
puter Prods., Inc. v. Whitfield, 203 U.S.P.Q. 1020, 1023 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1977) (by express con-
tract); Computer Print Sys. Inc. v. Lewis, 281 Pa. Super. 240, 250, 422 A.2d 148, 153 (1980) (by
confidential relationship only); J & K Computer Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 642 P.2d 732, 734 (Utah
1982) (by confidential relationship). For cases in which the courts did not find any employee duty
to protect, see Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691, 701-03 (Minn. 1982) (not
bound by express contract since material disclosed not trade secret); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Lindley,
609 P.2d 73, 745 (Okla. 1980) (same).
94. See Structural Dynamics Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp.
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tion, however, hold that when an employee develops the trade secret,
he has no duty to keep the information confidential. 95 On the other
hand, a majority of courts that deny trade secret protection to computer
programs conclude that an employee incurs no liability for disclosing
information regarding a program to third parties. 96 A few courts, how-
ever, protect such information from disclosure by an employee, even in
the absence of a frade secret.97
An example of a case in which a court found employees who devel-
oped a program liable for impermissible disclosure of their former em-
ployer's trade secrets is Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines
Corp. (IBM). 98 In this case, Telex induced several of IBM's key em-
ployees to join its firm. These former IBM employees revealed to Telex
a new source code99 which they had helped develop for IBM. By hiring
away IBM's key employees, Telex saved $10 million in development
costs.1° The court ruled that the source code constituted a trade se-
cret, 10 1 and that the employees had breached their express contract with
IBM and the confidential relationship they had developed with that
1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Telex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258
(N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 802
(1975); Corn-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D. Mich. 1971), a'd,
458 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); National Sur. Corp. v. Applied Sys., Inc., 418 So. 2d
847 (Ala. 1982); Cybertek Computer Prods., Inc. v. Whitfield, 203 U.S.P.Q. 1020 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1977); Computer Print Sys., Inc. v. Lewis, 281 Pa. Super. 240, 422 A.2d 148 (1980); J & K Com-
puter Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 642 P.2d 732 (Utah 1982).
95. See Structural Dynamics Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp.
1102, 1111-12 (E.D. Mich. 1975). See also Manos v. Melton, 358 Mich. 500, 100 N.W.2d 235
(1960) (employee entitled to use valuable techniques learned during former employment in new
job); Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960) (chemist hired to reverse engineer
formulas entitled to use those formulas in new employment).
96. Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v. Kinder, 360 F. Supp. 1044, 1049 (N.D. Tex. 1973), aI'd, 497
F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1974); Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691, 702 (Minn.
1982); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Lindley, 609 P.2d 733, 744-45 (Okla. 1980).
97. National Sur. Corp. v. Applied Sys., Inc., 418 So.2d 847, 849-50 (Ala. 1982) (based on
theory of conversion); Cybertek Computer Prods. Inc. v. Whitfield, 203 U.S.P.Q. 1020, 1023 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1977) (contract can require secrecy of that which is not subject to trade secret
protection).
98. 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973),rev'don other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
99. Source code refers to the instructions the programmer gives the computer. The computer
takes this code and generates an object code. Lay people can read source code; they cannot read
object code.
100. Id. at 911 n.10.
I01. Id. at 929.
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company.0 2 The court found that as a result of the misappropriation,
IBM lost its competitive advantage in this area. 0 3
Courts have also granted employers the benefits of trade secret pro-
tection in cases involving trade secrets which the defendants did not
develop or design.' ° For example, the court in Computer Print Sys-
tems, Inc. v. Lewis' 5 found a former officer of the plaintiff liable for
copying a computer program designed to expedite direct mail advertis-
ing, and for delivering the program to a customer of the plaintiff. 6
The minority rule imposes no duty on the part of an employee who
develops a trade secret to keep that information confidential. In Struc-
tural Dynamics Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp. ,1"7 indi-
vidual defendants, working under nondisclosure contracts for
Structural Dynamics, developed a general purpose isoparametric com-
puter program. 08 Subsequently, they resigned and established their
own competing business."t The court found that because the individ-
ual defendants developed the program, they had no general duty to
keep it confidential." 0 Nevertheless, the court felt compelled to decide
102. Id.
103. Id. at 911, 929.
Two recent state court decisions reach similar conclusions. In J & K Computer Sys., Inc. v.
Parrish, 642 P.2d 732 (Utah 1982), the defendant-employee transferred to a customer of the plain-
tiff a computer program which the defendant had developed while in plaintiffs employ. The court
held that the corporate plaintiff "owned" the program and that it was illegally misappropriated by
the defendant. Id. at 735. In Cybertek Computer Prods., Inc. v. Whitfield, 203 U.S.P.Q. 1020
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1977), the defendant, who had signed a nondisclosure contract, designed a
software system while employed by plaintiff. The Court held that by developing a similar system
for the plaintiffs competitor, the defendant breached his contractual duty of confidentiality. By
relying on the contract, the Court fulfilled the secrecy prong of the trade secret test.
104. See Coin-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D. Mich. 1971),
ae7'd. 458 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Computer Print Sys., Inc. v. Lewis, 281 Pa.
Super. 240, 422 A.2d 148 (1980).
105. 281 Pa. Super. 240, 422 A.2d 148 (1980).
106. The court stressed that the plaintiff had expended a great deal of money in developing the
program, and that the program gave the plaintiff a competitive advantage in the market. The
court admitted, however, that direct mail programs are common knowledge in the industry. One
may, therefore, question the soundness of the court's decision to grant trade secret protection in
this case. See supra notes 37-59 and accompanying text. See also Coin-Share Inc. v. Computer
Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (defendant liable for disclosing information
to third party in violation of contract between plaintiff and defendant specifically forbiding disclo-
sure), aff'd, 458 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1982).
107. 401 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
108 Id. at 1106.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1112.
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in favor of the employer because the individual defendants had signed
reasonable nondisclosure agreements."'
Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Systems 1 2 similarly illustrates a
situation in which a court denied trade secret protection for a computer
program. In this case, the individual defendant, pursuant to a nondis-
closure agreement, developed a software system for the plaintiff from
three commercially available subsystems." 3  Subsequently, he devel-
oped a similar system for the corporate defendant, and the plaintiff
sued for misappropriation of its confidential information. 114 The court
held that the plaintiff could not protect the program as its trade secret
because the system composed a part of the individual defendant's own
skill and knowledge." 5
Because of the uncertain dividing line between the employer's pro-
111. While no cases involving computer software follow Structural Dynamics, its reasoning is
not unique. See, e.g., Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1970) (where defendant
was hired expressly to reverse engineer competing firm's products, formulas derived belonged to
him as part of his knowledge). See also supra note 97.
The StructuralDynamics decision is particularly well-reasoned because of the court's thoughtful
analysis of the competing interests involved - society's need for useful knowledge, the employer's
need for secrecy to motivate inventiveness, and the interests of technically skilled employees
whose job mobility may become severely restricted by acquisition of trade secrets. 401 F. Supp. at
1111.
112. 318 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. 1982).
113. Id. at 701.
114. Id. at 703.
115. Id. at 701-03. The court acknowledged that the combination was not generally known to
the public, the plaintiff intended to keep it secret, and the system did provide a demonstrable
competitive advantage to the plaintiff. The combination, however, customized existing technology
and did not cause plaintiff to incur large expenses. Therefore, it did not constitute a trade secret.
Id. at 703. The Minnesota legislature has defined trade secrets by statute. See Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, MiNN. STAT. § 325C.01 subdiv. 5 (1980).
The Oklahoma Supreme Court decided a similar case in 1980. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Lind-
ley, 609 P.2d 733 (Okla. 1980). In this case the defendant-employee developed, over his em-
ployer's objection, on his own time and at his own expense, a well-logging computer program.
The court denied trade secret protection to the employer for the program and held that the em-
ployee had a right to disclose it. The court refused to bind defendant to his nondisclosure con-
tract. See also Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v. Kinder, 360 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Tex. 1973)
(defendant developed for his employer one of two existing programs for processing medicaid
forms; held employer has no recourse when defendant goes to work for employer's competitor and
implements only the other existing program), aft'd, 497 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1974); National Sur.
Corp. v. Applied Sys., Inc., 418 So. 2d 847 (Ala. 1982) (defendant developed computer programs
for employer, left and started own business in same field; court held programs convertible per-
sonal property and defendants liable for same).
Arguably, some of the cases cited above do not involve trade secrets as defined in this Note. See
supra notes 37-59 and accompanying text. Courts nevertheless held the individual defendants
liable. See Structural Dynamics Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp.
1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (no trade secret except that protected by contract); Cybertek Computer
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tectable rights in a specific program design or combination and the
programmer's skill and experience, the cases involving trade secret pro-
tection in the computer industry employment relationship1 6 present
particularly difficult questions. Courts, while attempting to balance
these competing interests, have been unable to achieve a uniform and
equitable solution.
V. SOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
Congress has failed to respond effectively to the continued judicial
confusion apparent in the computer employment cases. In the early
1970's there were unsuccessful attempts to legislatively establish an em-
ployee ownership right in patentable inventions and a compensation
system for this right." 7 Because of significant opposition, no plans ex-
ist for enacting federal legislation on this subject." 8
In the face of Congressional inaction and judicial uncertainty, some
commentators have urged a uniform statutory solution.1 9 The Ameri-
can Bar Association has developed a Uniform Trade Secret Act.' 20
The states, however, generally have not adopted the Act.' 2' Further-
more, the Act merely codified the position of the Restatement of
Torts 22 without clarifying the factors which should influence a finding
of trade secret protection for either the employer or employee. 23
Prods., Inc. v. Whitield, 203 U.S.P.Q. 1020 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1977) (contract may require secrecy
where common law offers no trade secret protection).
116. See supra notes 100-116 and accompanying text.
117. See H.R. 1483, 92 Cong., Ist Sess (1971); H.R. 15512, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Con-
gress modeled this act after a similar German law. See Kowarzik, Employee Invention Under
German Law, 54 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y, 807, 809 (1972). Although the proposed law dealt solely with
patentable inventions, the element of "ownership" is common to both trade secret and patent
protection.
118. R. MILRiM, supra note 29, § 5.02(4), at 5-37 n.61.1.
119. See Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIO STATE L.J. 4, 32 (1962) (suggests "petty patents";
federal statute requiring registration within one year of creation of confidential information, and
giving five years protection with option of renewal); Klein, The Technical Trade Secret Quadran-
gle, A Survey, 55 Nw. U. L. REv. 437, 465 (1960) (suggests uniform state act); Note, The Trade
Secret Quagmire-A Proposed Federal Solution, 50 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1063-70 (1966) (propos-
ing similar federal "patent" protection).
120. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT §§ 1-12, 14 U.L.A. 537-551 (1982 Master ed.).
121. To date, only Minnesota and Louisiana have adopted the Uniform Trade Secret Act with
a few minor changes. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13A:1431-1439 (West 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 325C.01-.08 (West 1980). See also Jostens v. National Computer Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691 (Minn.
1982) (applying Minnesota's new statute).
122. See 4 RESTATEMENT, supra note 38.
123. The Uniform Trade Secret Act only covers tort theories of recovery. UNIF. TRADE
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Similarly, the individual states have not developed their own statu-
tory solutions to this problem.' z4 Approximately one third of the states
have enacted statutes which apply exclusively to the theft of trade
secrets.12 5 Other states have expanded their theft or larceny statutes to
include the theft of trade secrets.'2 6 The majority of these statutes de-
fine trade secrets narrowly to include only scientific and technical infor-
mation embodied in tangible form.'27 Because of this narrow
definition, these statutes do not address the problem of misappropria-
tion of intangible business trade secrets.' 2 8
Colorado's statute most comprehensively covers trade secret theft.' 29
This statute protects tangible and intangible scientific and business
trade secrets. Unlike the other statutes which base the degree of culpa-
bility on the value of the trade secret misappropriated, the Colorado
statute provides one clearly defined penalty for all violations. 30  A
SECRTS Acr § 7, 14 U.L.A. 542 (1982 Master ed.). It expressly states that it does not cover
contract or breach of duty of confidentiality actions. Id The employer's successful defense
against trade secret misappropriation is most frequently based on the employment contract or on
the duty of confidentiality imposed by the employment relationship. Because the Act excludes
these areas from its coverage it fails to provide "uniform" treatment of similarly situated plaintiffs
and defendants. See 12A R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS app. A, at A-15 n.24.
124. Some states have no legislation concerning trade secrets, State Trade Secret Statutes, 1976
A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. RP. 212-14, reprinted in R. MILoRIM, Jupra note
29, at app. B. There are twelve such states: Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky,
Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota and Wyoming.
125. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2201(10), 41-2207 (Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1976); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 499(c) (West Supp. 1978); COL. REv. STAT. § 18-4-408 (Bradford-Robinson 1974); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 812.081(c) (West Supp. 1975); GA. CODE § 26-1806(a)(3) (Supp. 1978); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 266, §§ 30(4) 60A (West 1972); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 752.771(3), 752.772-.773 (Supp.
1978); NEB. REv. STAT. ch. 28 §§ 548.01(3), 548.02-.03 (1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-A-16-23
(Supp. 1969); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 155.00(6), 155.30(3), 165.07 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-75.1 (1969); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1333.51(3), 1333.99 (Page Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 1732(B)(c) (West Supp. 1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 3930 (Purdon 1973); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 39-4238(3), 39-4239 to -4240 (1975); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.05(a)(4) (Vernon
1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.205 (West Supp. 1978).
126. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-124 (West Supp. 1978); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 15-1 to
-9, 16-1 (1969); IND. CODE ANN. § 10-3048 to -3052 (Bums Supp. 1974); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
7 § 722 (Supp. 1973), tit. 17 § 2113 (Supp. 1970-71), tit. 17-A § 352(1)(F) (Supp. 1978); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, §§ 340(h)(1 1), 341-42 (Supp. 1978); MAss. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 266, §§ 30(4), 60A
(West 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.52 (West Supp. 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 94-2-
101(48)(j), 94-6-302 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 637:2(i), 637:3 (1974); N.J. REv. STAT.
§ 2C:20-1 to -3 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-401 (1978).
127. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 26-1806(a)(3) (Supp. 1978).
128. Id.
129. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-4-408 (Bradford-Robinson 1973).
130. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-4-408(3). The statute makes the theift of any trade secret a class
[Vol. 61:823
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well-publicized criminal statute of this variety may most effectively de-
ter errant employees.
Only Florida has an intellectual property statute which directly clas-
sifies the misappropriation of computer programs as a felony, but cov-
erage is restricted to the theft of tangible programs. 131
While criminal statutes may sufficiently deter employees to signifi-
cantly reduce misappropriation, socially valuable inventions could be
concommitantly discouraged. Therefore, a few states have passed civil
trade secret statutes. 132  The most effective of these statutes imposes
treble damages upon receivers of stolen trade secrets who knew or
should have known that the secrets were stolen.1 33 This statute could
reduce employers' incentives to actively seek employees from competi-
tors with the intent of gaining access to the competitors' trade secrets.
Three states recently enacted "Freedom to Create" statutes 134
which attempt to encourage invention by clearly delineating the situa-
tions in which an employee may expect to keep the product of his ef-
forts. 135  One of these statutes requires an employee hired for both
specific and general inventive positions to assign an invention 36 to the
employer if it relates to the business of the employer. 137 The other two
acts apply the same rule to employees in specific inventive positions,
one misdemeanor. A second offense within five years elevates the crime to a class four felony.
Id.
131. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 815.04 (West Supp. 1983).
132. CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 980-85 (West 1954) (provides exclusive property rights in employer
in inventions not disclosed to the public); CONN. ANTI-TRUST AcT, Pub. Act 608 (1972) (provides
treble damages and injunctive relief); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-102 (1981) (everything employee
acquires during employment, except compensation, belongs to employer); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
93, §§ 42, 42A (Supp. 1970) (provides tort liability along same lines as its criminal statute; pro-
vides both damages and injunctive relief); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-A-16-23 (Supp. 1969) (provides
for treble damages against purchaser of stolen trade secret who knew or should have known it was
stolen).
133. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-A-16-23 (Supp. 1969).
134. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2870-72 (West 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.78 (1978); WASH. REv.
CODE § 49.44(2)-(3) (1974 & Supp. 1979). These statutes govern only ownership rights under
employee invention agreements.
135. Like the failed federal statute, these state statutes apply only to patentable inventions and
are therefore not directly applicable to the present problem. These statutes do suggest, however,
one viable solution to the misappropriation of trade secrets.
136. WASH. RaV. CODE § 49.44(2)-(3) (1974 & Supp. 1979). It does not include employees
hired for non-inventive positions. Inventions of non-inventive position employees are not assigna-
ble to the employer.
137. Id.
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but do not require employees hired for general inventive purposes to
assign their inventions.
While these statutes add very little to the existing common law, they
mark a small advance in the right direction. The statutes clearly delin-
eate the groups of employees who must assign their inventions to the
employer pursuant to an employee invention agreement. Because most
key employees in the computer industry must sign such employment
agreements, legislatures should expand state statutes to encompass
ownership of trade secrets.13
Combining a reasonable employee nondisclosure agreement with a
statutory139 definition of the parties' ownership rights could eliminate
the confusion presently existing in the application of trade secret law to
the employment relationship."4 For instance, in addition to the gen-
eral language of the "Freedom to Create" acts, a broader statute could
require that the employer and employee meet periodically and sign an
agreement stating which projects the employer considers trade secrets.
This type of statute could also protect an employee from loss due to a
lack of bargaining power. An employee who believed that specific
trade secrets did not "belong" to the employer could petition an arbi-
trator whose identity could have been established in the original em-
ployee nondisclosure agreement. Finally, the statute could prohibit
retaliatory firing, so that employees would not be deterred from exer-
cising their rights through the fear of losing their jobs. By statutory
138. While confidential information constituting a trade secret may not pass the strict standard
of patentability, it does give the employer a competitive advantage if he succeeds in keeping it
secret. Employees usually develop the trade secret for the employer. Under a statute similar to
those discussed above, both the employer and employee would better understand their respective
positions upon entering the employment relationship.
139. A federal or model state statute would promote uniformity. Key employee mobility ex-
tends beyond state lines and therefore a uniform law is imperative.
140. Several practical problems inhere in this proposal. First, no figures are available on the
number of computer industry employees who change employment each year. Thus, this proposal
seeks to correct an admittedly unquantified problem. Second, an explicit, detailed, frequently
updated contract could increase the adversarial nature of the employment relationship. Third,
this proposal would highlight the admitted lack of trust which initially prompted action.
The greatest difficulty with private enforcement systems is their cost. Unless a firm can main-
tain these system costs for less than it would cost to litigate cases concerning misappropriation of
trade secrets by key employees, it will have no incentive to implement these programs. Most
likely, only firms with large research and development departments will find such a system eco-
nomically feasible because the cost of such a program would be less than their projected litigation
costs.
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delineation of trade secret ownership in the employment relationship,
private control costs would be reduced.
Alternatively, employers and employees could expand the use of rea-
sonable employee nondisclosure agreements. A firm with a large re-
search and development department might find it profitable to appoint
a supervisor to oversee and review on-going projects to determine those
which need trade secret protection; after this initial determination the
supervisor could prepare a nondisclosure agreement to be signed by
employees involved with these projects. If an employee believed that
an item did not deserve nondisclosure protection, he could invoke an
arbitration procedure similar to the one outlined in the statutory solu-
tion set forth above. In firms with smaller research and development
departments, existing departmental project supervisors could follow the
suggested procedure.
Conclusion
In distinguishing between the knowledge, skill and ability which be-
long to an employee programmer, and the concept, method or process
developed by the employee which belongs to the employer, the courts
have failed to articulate a clear standard for balancing competing social
policies. Courts have generally favored the interests of the employer
without thoroughly considering whether the work product involved
warranted elevation to trade secret status. Thus, employers and em-
ployees alike are uncertain as to their legal rights. This uncertainty has
deterred invention and research and development, and has encouraged
unfair practices. The combined statutory and contractual solution sug-
gested in this Note would promote competing social policies and would
interject an element of certainty into the employment relationship in
the computer software industry.
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